Submitted by: Andre Ourthiague

China has long attracted the satellite industry with a set of demographics that seems to make it an ideal market: large and diverse landmass, enormous population with substantial ethnic and linguistic diversity, a fast growing middle class, rapidly rising penetration of pay television and broadband services, and a government actively seeking to “bridge the digital divide” between the relatively wealthy eastern half of the country and the economically disadvantaged rural, western regions.

The above is the opening to an American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) paper regarding the Chinese space market. The growth of China has caused a booming need for increased technology/communication services and in turn a large demand for the satellite industry. However, the Chinese space market is not always accessible to US companies due to US government policy. International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR) limits the importing and exporting of certain US articles contained on the US munitions list. The following white paper is a recent review of US ITAR policy.

ITAR is in place to prevent the transfer of US technology. This is not unreasonable; the US needs to hold certain things very close to its chest. The problem arises from what is contained on the ?flagged? munitions list.The list contains expected items such as: firearms, guns, ammunition, ballistic missiles, nuclear technology, etc. However, it also contains the following: Aircraft and associated equipment, spacecraft systems and associated equipment, optical technology, guidance/control equipment, technical data (encryption and coding) contained in defense services. It doesn?t take a rocket scientist (get it?) to realize that the aerospace industry is severely crippled when attempting to deal overseas (China and India are major issues from an ITAR standpoint, but even European nations are forced to jump through ITAR hoops.) The Munitions list is strict enough that the aerospace industry is not the only industry that must overcome ITAR obstacles. Any business that involves ITAR sensitive articles involves lots of red tape to obtain the necessary government approval. Communication companies spend millions each year on ITAR personnel and consulting because of the technologies used in their products often appear on the US munitions list.

How serious are ITAR violations? In 1997 Loral Space Systems and Boeing were fined for a failed satellite launch in China. The Intelsat 708 was set to launch from a Chinese launch site, but shortly after lift-off it failed and crashed in rural China. Boeing alone was fined $20 million for transferring sensitive satellite technologies to a foreign government (they later incurred an additional fine for filing a failure report to the Chinese launch program that was deemed too detailed.) A professor from UCLA was fined and fired for allowing a Chinese born student to work on a satellite design team despite being warned not to do so. This action was deemed to violate ITAR as it transferred technical defense knowledge to a ?foreign agency.?

Two quick anecdotes sum up my personal experience with ITAR (they show how restrictive it can be on seemingly trivial items). Before a recent Spacecraft design tour to Lockheed Martin, a Cal Poly student was told she was not allowed to make the trip because she was born in Columbia (the same student had a job offer pulled by Boeing because the government would not give her the required security clearance Boeing required her to have.) Also, during the same class, the teacher (who is still a Boeing employee) would constantly have to check himself before he answered a question from a student. I remember asking if it was possible to use a certain material in my design and the response was a very simple, ?I am not at liberty to discuss specifics on this.?

International Trafficking and Arms Regulation is a perfect example of US policy that needs to be seriously reevaluated in an increasingly global world. Restricting the transfer of sensitive military knowledge is understandable. However, when policy begins restricting the flow of ideas and possible technology advancement something is wrong. Unfortunately, it may be a long time before the US realizes that policing the world comes at the cost of possible advancement. ITAR is the major policy issue I have personal experience with coming from an engineering background. Feel free to mention any other policy that limits (intentionally or unintentionally) the flow of ideas between the US and other nations.